Elena's Movie Review Madness

Reviews from my 11-year old mind!

The regulation provides for a class exemption from Section 101, paragraph 1, of the TFUE for vertical agreements that meet certain requirements. These agreements may, for example, help a manufacturer open a new market or prevent a distributor from “driving freely” on the advertising efforts of another distributor, or allowing a supplier to devalue an investment for a given customer. Selective distribution agreements are popular in a wide range of sectors, including cosmetics, sporting goods and household appliances. Among the most frequently reported restrictions by NCAs in this context are restrictions on online sales, market/platform sales, price comparison tools, keyword offerings, double prices, retail sales and cross-selling. The public consultation showed that stakeholders generally believe that selective distribution agreements should continue to be exempt from blocking, as these agreements protect brand value, stakeholder investment and the development of additional distribution services. For the application of Article 101, paragraph 3 of the EC Treaty, it is not necessary to define the vertical agreements that may fall under Article 101, paragraph 1 of the EC Treaty. When assessing the agreements under Article 101, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, several factors should be taken into account, in particular the market structure on the supply and procurement side. Vertical agreements that meet the criteria for exemption by category of vertical agreements (VABE) are exempt from the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ban). However, the rules for dominant firms continue to apply. In order to gather in-depth and quality evidence on the main competition issues raised by vertical relations, the Commission published a questionnaire. The questionnaire covers five evaluation criteria: the competition authority of a Member State may, in accordance with Article 29, paragraph 2, of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, gain the advantage of this regulation for the territory of that Member State; or part of it, if, in a particular case, an agreement with which the application of the exemption under this Regulation nevertheless has effects inconsistent with Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on the territory of that Member State or part of it, and if that territory has all the characteristics of a separate geographical market.

Another priority area of the Commission is geographical blocking. The recent fines imposed by the Commission on Guess and Nike underline the importance of the completion of the Digital Single Market and the role of competition law. For example, Nike was fined for prohibiting merchants from selling licensed products in other countries within the EEA. Finally, the Commission sent a statement of objections to Valve and five video game publishers to prevent consumers from buying cross-border video games in other Member States. In deciding whether to withdraw the benefits of this regulation in accordance with Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, the anti-competitive effects that may result from the existence of parallel networks of vertical agreements with similar effects that significantly limit access to or competition in a particular market. These cumulative effects can occur, for example. B, in the case of selective ban on distribution or non-competition. CCPC extends vertical data reporting – The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) today extended the validity of its statement on vertical agreements and concerted practices (the “declaration”) until December 1, 2022. The statement came on 1 December (…) The VBER and its related guidelines exempt certain vertical agreements from the prohibition under Article 101, paragraph 1 of the TFUE and contain certain “core” restrictions against certain vertical behaviours.

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